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The federal government spent $92 billion in
direct and indirect subsidies to businesses and pri-
vate-sector corporate entities—expenditures com-
monly referred to as “corporate welfare”—in fiscal
year 2006. The definition of business subsidies
used in this report is broader than that used by the
Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic
Analysis, which recently put the costs of direct
business subsidies at $57 billion in 2005. For the
purposes of this study, “corporate welfare” is
defined as any federal spending program that pro-
vides payments or unique benefits and advantages
to specific companies or industries. 
Supporters of corporate welfare programs
often justify them as remedying some sort of
market failure. Often the market failures on
which the programs are predicated are either
overblown or don’t exist. Yet the federal govern-
ment continues to subsidize some of the biggest
companies in America. Boeing, Xerox, IBM,
Motorola, Dow Chemical, General Electric, and
others have received millions in taxpayer-funded
benefits through programs like the Advanced
Technology Program and the Export-Import
Bank. In addition, the federal crop subsidy pro-
grams continue to fund the wealthiest farmers.
Because the corporate welfare state tran-
scends any specific agency—and therefore any
specific congressional committee—one way to
reform or terminate those programs would be
through a corporate welfare reform commission
(CWRC). That commission could function like
the successful military base closure commission.
The CWRC would compose a list of corporate
welfare programs to eliminate and then present
that list to Congress, which would be required to
hold an up-or-down vote on the commission’s
proposal. 
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Introduction
The federal government spent $92 billion
on direct and indirect subsidies to businesses
and private-sector corporate entities—expen-
ditures commonly referred to as “corporate
welfare”—in fiscal year 2006, as detailed in
Table 1. In nominal terms, that’s an increase
of 11 percent from fiscal 2001. In real terms,
it’s a 3 percent decline. In other words, the
corporate welfare state—the sum total of gov-
ernment programs that subsidize business in
one form or another—grew at a rate just
slightly slower than inflation over the past
five years. But as you can also see in Table 1,
many specific programs grew much faster.
The corporate welfare budget supports a
wide-ranging collection of programs, descrip-
tions of which appear in Appendix 1. Many
agencies administer federal subsidies to busi-
ness. The fact that the corporate welfare state
is so diffuse makes it difficult for policymak-
ers to monitor. It’s hard for any one congres-
sional committee—even if its members are so
inclined—to target much of this spending
because the corporate welfare state transcends
any particular agency or interest group. 
For the purposes of this study, “corporate
welfare” is defined as any federal spending
program that provides payments or unique
benefits and advantages to specific compa-
nies or industries. This broad definition
includes direct subsidies and grants to specif-
ic companies, such as cash payments to farm-
ers and research funds to high-tech compa-
nies, as well as indirect subsidies, such as
funding for overseas promotion of specific
U.S. products and industries. Sometimes cor-
porate welfare supports profitable compa-
nies that don’t need any help. Sometimes cor-
porate welfare programs prop up industries
that are doing poorly in the marketplace and
should be allowed to fail.
This report covers only subsidy programs
that result in direct expenditures within the
federal budget. It does not include tax prefer-
ences or trade restrictions. It also does not
account for implicit benefits received by gov-
ernment-sponsored enterprises. Those issues
are discussed in Appendix 2.  
The estimate in this report differs from the
annual estimate of business subsidies issued by
the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of
Economic Analysis.1 The BEA definition of sub-
sidies includes only direct transfers to corpora-
tions, such as crop support payments or export
promotion subsidies that flow to specific com-
panies. Their estimate of federal subsidy expen-
ditures for 2005—the most recent BEA estimate
available—equals $57 billion. That’s $35 billion
less than the estimate for 2006 in this study.
That’s mainly because the list of business sub-
sidy programs in this report, unlike the BEA
estimate, also includes research and develop-
ment (R&D) subsidies as well as indirect subsi-
dies such as “extension” and “demonstration”
projects, which provide advice and manage-
ment assistance to companies, and expendi-
tures by agencies that enforce trade barriers and
other impediments to competition, just to
name a few. 
In some respects, the term “corporate wel-
fare” may not be the most apt descriptor for
many of these programs. The term “welfare”
seems to imply ongoing yearly support. Some
federal programs, such as the annual crop
subsidies paid to farmers, certainly provide
that. But other expenditures, such as research
grants, might provide only a one-time sub-
sidy that is not renewed every year. So, in this
report the term “corporate welfare” is used to
describe the general nature of a program that
subsidizes or primarily benefits business in a
way that may or may not necessarily entail a
repeated and ongoing transfer of resources
from taxpayers.  
Finally, a word about the sorts of R&D
spending included in this study’s definition of
corporate welfare. The federal government
generally funds three sorts of research: basic,
applied, and developmental. Basic research is
characterized as having no immediate or
direct market application. The approach
taken in this study is to exclude basic research
and focus instead on the sorts of research that
have direct commercial application. Thus, the
R&D programs included in Table 1 are those
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3Table 1
Corporate Welfare Programs by Agency (in millions of nominal dollars)
2001 2006 Percentage
Department Outlays Outlays Change
Department of Agriculture
Agricultural Marketing Service 926 1,408 52%
Applied agricultural research and development 921 1,313 43%
Farm Security and Rural Investment programs 403 1,512 275%
Farm Service Agency
Agricultural Credit Insurance Fund 749 636 -15%
Conservation Reserve Program 1,623 1,801 11%
Crop and farm support (Commodity Credit Corporation Fund) 34,453 32,750 -5%
Export loans 107 142 33%
Market Access Program 96 157 64%
Tobacco Trust Fund/quota buyout - 891 N/A
Foreign Agricultural Service
Subsidies for foreign purchase of commodities (P.L. 480) 1,260 254 -80%
Market access and development programs 69 102 48%
Trade Adjustment Assistance - 3 N/A
Federal Crop Insurance premium subsidies 2,463 2,291 -7%
Rural Business-Cooperative Service
Biomass commercialization subisides 26 7 -73%
Rural empowerment zones/community grants 12 13 8%
Cooperative development grants 3 29 867%
Development loan subsidies 30 28 -7%
Rural Community Advancement Program
Loan subsidies 415 212 -49%
Rural business grants 58 55 -5%
Rural Utilities Service
Electrictrification and telecommunications subsidies 489 128 -74%
Total, Department of Agriculture 44,103 43,732 -1%
Department of Commerce
Economic Development Administration 334 284 -15%
International Trade Administration 328 426 30%
Minority Business Development Agency 414 29 -93%
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Advanced Technology Program 177 73 -59%
Manufacturing Extension Partnership 106 111 5%
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
National Marine Fisheries Service 662 811 23%
Fishery promotion and development subsidies 3 12 300%
Total, Department of Commerce 2,024 1,746 -14%
Department of Defense
Applied R&D funding 7,691 11,814 54%
Total, Department of Defense 7,691 11,814 54%
Department of Energy
Energy supply subsidies 1,194 964 -19%
Fossil energy research and development 385 268 -30%
Coal Research Initiative 97 310 220%
Continued on next page
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4Table 1—Continued
2001 2006 Percentage
Department Outlays Outlays Change
Hyrdrogen Fuel Initiative - 154
FreedomCAR/21st Century Truck Patnership 254 179 -30%
Total, Department of Energy 1,930 1,875 -3%
Department of Housing and Urban Development
Federal Housing Administration 
Mortgage subsidies 5,209 4,470 -14%
Economic Development Initiative Grants 294 255 -13%
Community Development Block Grants 478 380 -21%
Community Development Loans and credit subsidies (Section 108 ) 7 11 57%
Total, Department of Housing and Urban Development 5,988 5,116 -15%
Department of State
Foreign Military Financing Programs 4,310 4,610 7%
Total, Department of State 4,310 4,610 7%
Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration
Commercial Space Transportation 12 11 -8%
Essential Air Service/Payments to Air Carriers 55 99 80%
Grants-in-Aid for Airports 2,017 3,841 90%
Federal Railroad Administration
Amtrak subsidies 553 1,257 127%
Next Generation High-Speed Rail 20 28 40%
Railroad research and development 21 52 148%
Maritime Administration
Guaranteed loan program 45 41 -9%
Ocean freight differential subsidies 28 269 861%
Maritime Security Program 98 150 53%
Total, Deparment of Transportation 2,849 5,748 102%
Other Programs and Independent Agencies
Agency for International Development economic development 
programs 1182 1,417 20%
Appalachian Regional Commission 94 71 -24%
Bureau of Reclamation 875 933 7%
Corporation for Public Broadcasting 360 460 28%
Export-Import Bank 1,655 318 -81%
International Trade Commission 49 64 31%
National Institutes of Health—Applied Biomedical Research/
Clinical Development 7,943 12,042 52%
NASA: Aerospace technology and commercialization 1,382 884 -36%
Overseas Private Investment Corporation 51 181 255%
Small Business Administration 556 905 63%
Trade and Development Agency 54 51 -6%
Total, Other Programs and Independent Agencies 14,201 17,326 22%
Grand Total 83,096 91,967 11%
Source: Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government (Washington: Government
Publishing Office), various years; and data from the American Association for the Advancement of Science R&D
Budget and Policy Program, various years.
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that intentionally seek to help develop prod-
ucts—called “commercialization” research—as
well as those that seek to develop “dual-use
technologies” with a military as well as com-
mercial use and programs that seek to arrange
“technology transfer” between government-
funded labs and private-sector businesses for
the purposes of advancing commercial goals.2
What’s Wrong with Federal
Business Subsidies?
Supporters of federal subsidies to private
industry often maintain that government sup-
port of business is in the national interest. For
instance, government support is said to reme-
dy market failure by assisting disadvantaged
groups who cannot receive private funding to
establish new businesses. Supporters of corpo-
rate welfare programs also justify business
subsidies as a way to help maintain the com-
petitiveness of certain critical industries. Yet
those justifications do not stand up to scruti-
ny. There are many reasons why such policies
are misguided:
Government Is Ill-Suited to Finding the
“Next Big Thing” 
The function of private capital markets is
to direct investment to industries and firms
that offer the highest potential rate of return.
The capital markets, in effect, are in the full-
time business of selecting corporate winners
and losers. Yet the underlying premise of
many federal business subsidies is that the
government can direct the limited pool of
capital funds just as effectively as, if not bet-
ter than, markets can. The truth is that capi-
tal markets are far more agile than govern-
ment and are much better suited to acting on
sophisticated market signals than govern-
ment ever could be.3
In addition, supporters of government pro-
grams often suggest that corporate subsidy
programs are necessary to remedy some sort of
market failure. On closer inspection, most of
those proclaimed market failures simply do
not exist. For instance, supporters of the Small
Business Administration allege that the agency
provides credit for firms that could not get
loans in the private capital markets. Research
on the subject, however, has shown that small
businesses do not face insurmountable obsta-
cles to finding willing lenders and sources of
credit funding.4 The market failure justifica-
tion is also used by supporters of programs
geared to funding high-tech research, but, as
we’ll see in the Case Studies section below, the
market has not failed to deliver sufficient ven-
ture capital to advance important new techno-
logical discoveries. 
Corporate Welfare Programs Create an
Incestuous Relationship between
Business and Government
In Washington, industry trade associa-
tions and lobbying firms continually pres-
sure lawmakers to give out new business sub-
sidies or to protect long-standing handouts.
That is a natural byproduct of a government
that uses its power to give taxpayer money to
favored interests. If there were no possibility
that subsidies might be offered, demands for
them would diminish if not disappear. 
That tendency is nurtured by the problem
of concentrated benefits and diffuse costs.5
Subsidies are usually given to a few recipients
at the expense of many taxpayers. Because
there are such a large number of taxpayers—
and each corporate subsidy may cost each
taxpayer only a few cents or a few dollars—
most individual citizens don’t have an inter-
est in lobbying against subsidies since the
cost of doing so far outweighs simply paying
the taxes. However, the recipients of those
subsidies have a substantial interest in mak-
ing sure they protect the flow of money to
them. That leads to a great deal of lobbying
by special interests but very little lobbying on
behalf of taxpayers. 
In addition, subsidies create a perverse
incentive for businesses: if an entrepreneur’s
competitors are receiving help from the gov-
ernment, it may appear to be in his or her
interest to try to get some of that help, too.
That incentive serves only to turn many busi-
nesspeople into lobbyists, sidetracking them
5
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from their role as entrepreneurs. That, in turn,
leads to an overallocation of private resources
to pursuing and protecting government subsi-
dies. 
Corporate Welfare Programs Violate
Constitutional Principles
Direct corporate subsidies fall outside the
limited enumerated functions of the federal
government. Nowhere in the Constitution is
Congress granted the authority to spend funds
to directly subsidize industry, or to enter into
joint ventures with automobile companies, or
to guarantee loans to favored business owners.
Yet, since the New Deal, by applying very expan-
sive readings of the General Welfare Clause, the
Supreme Court has allowed Congress to redis-
tribute wealth from taxpayers to favored busi-
ness interests.6 Some spending that benefits
businesses, such as infrastructure spending and
the funding of courts to enforce contracts, also
benefits the population as a whole. But those
are expenditures that benefit all companies and
citizens generally and are usually not geared to
a specific activity or industry. The programs of
the corporate welfare state, on the other hand,
do not fit this definition.
Case Studies
Case Study no. 1: Subsidies for
Agribusiness
The biggest direct subsidy program in the
federal budget is crop and farm subsidies. In
fiscal year 2006, taxpayers footed the bill for
$21 billion in agricultural subsidies.7 Eleven
years ago, Congress voted to phase down farm
subsidies through 2001. Instead, the opposite
has occurred: a series of so-called emergency
spending bills and the resurrection of a price
support program in 2002 have since hiked
subsidy levels to near-record highs.
Figure 1 shows the trend of farm subsidy
payments between 1990 and 2005. The years
in which farm subsidies were the lowest
(1994 through 1997) correspond with two
key events: (1) a rise in commodity prices and
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(2) the passage of the Federal Agriculture
Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of
1996, often referred to as the Freedom to
Farm Act. Subsidy levels before 1996 were set
by a formula that triggered an increase in
farm subsidies when crop prices fell. Starting
in 1995, crop prices began to rise, thereby
allowing subsidy levels to drop. 
The Freedom to Farm Act, passed in 1996
when commodity prices were high and demand
for subsidies was low, ended the price support
program and replaced it with a declining fixed
payment unrelated to market prices. Farm sub-
sidies were scheduled to decline from $5.6 bil-
lion in 1996 to $4 billion by 2002.8 After that,
crop subsidies were set to disappear.
The scheduled phaseout remained intact for
about two years until Congress reversed course
in 1998. When crop prices began to decline that
year, Congress passed a large “emergency” sup-
plemental appropriation that hiked total farm
subsidies to $12.4 billion. Subsequent supple-
mental legislation spurred farm subsidies to
new heights, amounting to a total of over $79.5
billion between 1999 and 2002. That’s $60 bil-
lion more than the Freedom to Farm Act’s
phaseout of crop subsidies would have allowed
if subsidies had been cut as promised.9
In May 2002 President Bush signed into
law a new six-year appropriation that put the
final nail in the coffin of the Freedom to
Farm Act’s commitment to weaning farmers
from taxpayer support. Instead of zeroing
out farm subsidies, the legislation created a
new version of the old price support program
that was estimated to cost taxpayers $99 bil-
lion in direct subsidies over six years.10 The
four fiscal years since the enactment of the
2002 farm bill have already seen an estimated
$72.9 billion spent on farm subsidies.11
Although members of Congress from farm
states have an interest in continuing to subsi-
dize farmers, the United States has prospered
even while the farm sector has shrunk as a per-
centage of the overall economy. Over the last 50
years, the number of people working and living
on farms has dropped. Farm employment—
including farm proprietors as well as wage and
salary workers—makes up less than 2 percent of
total employment in the United States.12 The
percentage of Americans who lived on farms
dropped from 16.6 percent in 1948 to around 2
percent in just over 40 years.13 Yet thanks to
technological advances, farm productivity is at
a historically high level.14
Despite what some farm-state politicians
might say, farms do not need to compose a
substantial portion of the economy for the
United States to remain economically strong.
A smaller farm sector is not a sign of eco-
nomic decline. Quite the contrary: a farm sec-
tor that can produce substantial amounts of
food with less capital and fewer workers is a
testament to economic progress.  
However, the conventional wisdom con-
tinues to view federal agricultural programs
as vital to preserving impoverished and belea-
guered family farms in the United States. The
reality is quite different from the popular
notions about farming in America today.
Most farmers are relatively wealthy. Average
income for farm households has exceeded
the national average by 5 to 17 percent every
year since 1996.15 By contrast, when large-
scale federal farm subsidies began in the
1930s, farmers’ incomes were only half the
national average.16 As the Department of
Agriculture itself reports, “Farm households
have higher incomes, greater wealth, and
lower consumption expenditures than do
other U.S. households.”17
Most farmers don’t receive direct subsi-
dies from the federal government. The tax-
payer-financed handouts go to only about
one-third of the nation’s farmers and ranch-
ers. So where does all the taxpayer money
spent on farmers actually go? Mainly to large
corporate agribusinesses and the richest
farmers. In 2005, the most recent year for
which comprehensive statistics are available,
the richest 10 percent of all subsidy recipients
received 66 percent of all subsidies.18
There are a variety of reasons to terminate
farm subsidies.19 There are, however, no
defensible reasons to continue them. Those
programs exist today mainly as a way for
politicians to shower taxpayer money on
powerful interest groups.
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Case Study no. 2: Subsidies for High-
Tech Companies
The Advanced Technology Program and
the Small Business Innovative Research pro-
gram show why government is ill-suited to
discover and fund the technological advances
that fuel the high-tech economy.
The ATP was created in 1988 to support
technological research that had the potential
to provide broad-based economic benefits for
the nation. The presumption was that the pro-
gram, part of the Commerce Department’s
National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy, would give a boost to technologies that
were “pre-competitive” or “high risk” and
could not get funding on their own in private
capital markets. Since its inception, the pro-
gram has funded more than 768 projects at a
cost of at least $2.3 billion in federal matching
funds.20
Program supporters suggest that ATP is a
funder of last resort for high-tech businesses.
However, a study by the General Accounting
Office (now the Government Accountability
Office) found that 63 percent of the companies
that applied for ATP grants didn’t look for pri-
vate capital or other sources of investment
before they applied for government money.21
That raises some serious questions: Are the
projects that the government funds examples
of promising but overlooked entrepreneurial
initiatives? Or are they mostly examples of how
savvy businesses can get the federal govern-
ment to underwrite their products’ R&D?
The evidence seems to indicate the latter. A
recent GAO study points out that some of the
biggest ATP expenditures went to research ven-
tures that were already generously supported by
the private sector. For instance, the ATP spent
$1.2 million in the early 1990s to develop a sys-
tem to recognize cursive handwriting for pen-
based computer inputs, such as those used in
handheld devices today. In fact, this line of
research had begun in the private sector during
the late 1950s, and patents for workable versions
of the technology were issued five years before
the start of the ATP-funded project. Companies
like Apple Computers and Motorola were
already well on their way to coming to market
with versions of this technology. Other tech-
nologies that were already well funded and
researched by the private sector were methods to
expand the capacity of fiber optic cables and
technology to regenerate human tissue and
organs. The ATP spent roughly $2 million to
duplicate funding for R&D in those technolo-
gies.22 There is obviously no market failure here.
These supposedly precompetitive technologies
were able to attract substantial funding in the
private sector.
ATP grants have gone to some of the
biggest companies in America or their sub-
sidiaries—all of them companies that have no
trouble funding their own R&D. Over the
last 12 years, many Fortune 500 companies
or their subsidiaries have received millions of
dollars of ATP funding (Table 2).23 Top bene-
ficiaries of ATP grants over the past 15 years
include IBM, General Electric, Honeywell,
Xerox, and Dow Chemical.  
In addition to being duplicative, govern-
ment funding of research often ends up sim-
ply underwriting other aspects of corporate
operations, as a study of the Small Business
Innovative Research program indicates. The
SBIR is a less high-profile program than ATP,
but its budget is actually much larger—about
$1 billion—because it consists of portions of
many federal agency research budgets. 
Created in 1982, the SBIR has as its goal
to “stimulate technological innovation.”24
Instead, the result has been a crowding out of
private research spending by firms receiving
government money. In other words, for every
dollar of SBIR grant money the average com-
pany receives, it reduces its own R&D by a
dollar.25 That forgone dollar of R&D money
does not disappear. It goes to fund another
aspect of the firm’s operations. The conse-
quence is that, instead of contributing to an
overall increase in R&D spending, the federal
government finds itself underwriting the
profit margins of small businesses and cor-
porations. 
Case Study no. 3: Subsidies for Exporters 
The mission statement of the Export-
Import Bank (or Ex-Im Bank, for short) stip-
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ulates that the bank’s main purpose is to
finance the purchase of U.S. goods in foreign
markets.26 The justification it provides for its
fiscal 2008 budget request is more transpar-
ent and perhaps more honest: “to sustain
U.S. jobs by financing U.S. exports.”27 The
Ex-Im Bank does that by using taxpayer
money to subsidize loans to foreign pur-
chasers of U.S. products and to provide loans
and loan guarantees to U.S. companies seek-
ing to enter export markets. It also provides
insurance for companies investing overseas. 
9
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Table 2
ATP Awards to Fortune 500 Companies (1991–present)
Company ATP Grants ($ millions)
IBM Corporation 49.2
General Electric 32.2
Honeywell International 29.0
Xerox 28.5
Dow Chemical 24.9
Caterpillar 24.3
Motorola 20.5
3M 19.5
United Technologies 14.6
Ford Motor 13.1
Science Applications Intl. 11.5
DuPont 10.3
General Motors 9.1
Corning 8.0
Goodrich Corporation 7.9
Advanced Micro Devices 7.4
Praxair 5.5
Air Products & Chemicals 4.1
Lucent Technologies 4.0
General Dynamics 3.6
Danaher 3.3
Cummins 2.8
Northrop Grumman 2.4
Dana 2.0
Johnson & Johnson 2.0
Medtronic, Inc. 2.0
Rohm and Haas Company 2.0
Sealed Air Corporation 2.0
Texas Instruments 2.0
Owens Corning 1.9
Engelhard 1.8
Chevron Phillips 1.7
Chevron Texaco 1.7
Raytheon 1.3
Monsanto 1.1
Baxter International 1.0
Source: Author's calculations based on data from the ATP Funded Projects Database, http://jazz.nist.gov/atpcf/prj
briefs/listmaker.cfm.
Note: Grants to subsidiaries of each company are included in the aggregate dollar amount of the parent company.
An ATP grant is counted in this table only if the Fortune 500 company is the lead grant recipient.
339840 Pa592_1stclass.qxp  5/8/2007  11:31 AM  Page 9
The loans and guarantees that Ex-Im Bank
grants to U.S. companies qualify it as the
underwriter of the sales of some of the biggest
Fortune 500 companies, none of which would
have trouble getting funding for worthwhile
overseas projects. As Table 3 shows, Boeing is
the largest corporate beneficiary of Ex-Im
Bank loan activity, leading many commenta-
tors to refer to the Ex-Im Bank as “Boeing’s
Bank.”28
Supporters of the Ex-Im Bank suggest that
government credit is needed to level the play-
ing field for U.S. companies as they compete
against foreign companies that receive sup-
port from their governments. Yet the Ex-Im
Bank’s most recent annual Competitiveness
Report points out that fewer than one-third of
all its loans and guarantees go to counter sub-
sidized foreign competition.29
Instead, most of the Ex-Im Bank’s loan
and guarantee portfolio is geared toward
providing credit for overseas projects and
purchases that the bank says could not
receive private funding. However, 99 percent
of capital-intensive projects in developed
countries are already financed by private bor-
rowers. The amount for developing countries
is 89.7 percent. The Ex-Im Bank provides a
mere 2 percent of the financing for projects
in developing countries.30
Those data do not provide good evidence
that there is a failure in the credit markets.
Private capital markets have been able to suc-
cessfully provide virtually all of the funding
for overseas projects and acquisitions of U.S.
products. If the projects the Ex-Im Bank
underwrites were not able to receive funding
in private markets, it’s probably because those
projects simply weren’t ones that investors
found worthwhile, or because the interest
rates on those loans were higher than the com-
panies were willing to accept. This is not an
example of market failure—it is a testament to
how well private capital markets work. 
Conclusion:
A Proposal to Eliminate the
Corporate Welfare State
Any attempt to terminate business subsidy
programs will require altering the incentives of
legislators. Individual members of Congress
lack the incentive to discipline themselves. If
they were successful in saving taxpayer money
by defunding a particular program, less
abstemious members might be able to use
that money to bolster the budget of a favored
program. Also, member A knows that voting
for a decrease in member B’s favored program
might result in future reprisals. For those rea-
sons, attempts to defund these programs one
by one, or in small groups, during the annual
appropriations process are not likely to yield
results. An institutional problem of this sort
requires an institutional solution. 
One way out of this dilemma might be a cor-
porate welfare reform commission (CWRC).
General guidelines for a bill creating a CWRC
could be as follows:
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Table 3
Export-Import Bank Long-Term Loan Guarantees to Fortune 500 Companies
Company Total Long-Term Guarantees ($ millions) Percentage of Total
Boeing 4,447.1 54.5%
General Electric 1,440.9 17.6%
Conoco Phillips 403.5 4.9%
Deere & Co. 37.6 0.5%
Raytheon 31.2 0.4%
Halliburton 12.4 0.2%
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Export-Import Bank, 2006 Annual Report (Washington:
Export-Import Bank, 2007).
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• The commission would not be com-
posed of sitting members of Congress. It
would be chosen by bipartisan agree-
ment between the president and the lead-
ership of both houses of Congress. 
• The commission would convene for the
purpose of proposing a list of corporate
welfare programs that should be elimi-
nated. 
• The commission would address only
spending programs, not tax preferences
in the budget, and no corporate welfare
spending programs should be consid-
ered “off the table.”
• The commission’s list of recommended
program terminations would be voted
on by both houses of Congress, with no
amendments, within 60 days of the
commission’s final report.
A commission structured along those
lines would solve two main problems: 
• The special interests dilemma: Because
the members of the commission would
not be incumbent lawmakers, they would
be far more insulated from political con-
cerns. While there would still be special
interest pressure on the members of the
commission, that pressure is likely to be
much less effective at achieving the goals
of the lobbyists.
• The collective choice dilemma: Because
every program would be terminated by an
up-or-down vote on an unamendable bill,
there would be no vote trading on the
specifics of the bill as there is during the
normal appropriations process. The com-
mission would have the ability to cast a
wide net and create a list of programs that
would hit a larger number of special inter-
est constituencies than any one member
of, or group within, Congress would pro-
pose. To further enhance the possibility of
success, the commission could present to
Congress its list of program terminations
in a nonelection year.
The CWRC has an ancestor in the Base
Realignment and Closure Commission. The
BRAC was created after the collapse of the
Soviet Union, at a time when there was a gen-
eral understanding that even though the mili-
tary base structure then “made little sense on
the whole, Congress could not bring itself to
close specific bases.”31 During the 10 years
before BRAC, “Congress prohibited studies of
whether bases should be closed, required an
environmental impact statement for any pro-
posed closure, and attached riders to appro-
priations bills to bar the spending of funds to
close particular bases.”32 Although many
members of Congress liked the idea of closing
military bases in the abstract, they were rarely
willing to vote for a bill that would close a base
in their district. As in the case of corporate wel-
fare programs, Congress soon found itself
unable, because of institutional and political
biases, to downsize the defense budget at a
time when doing so was often cited by mem-
bers of both parties as an important goal. 
A final reason to convene such a commis-
sion is that sunlight is the best disinfectant. A
corporate welfare commission would finally
allow scrutiny of those programs in a coordi-
nated public proceeding. That’s not some-
thing that happens regularly in Congress
today, and it’s long past time for sustained
public attention to a debate on the merits of
the federal government’s role in subsidizing
private companies.
Appendix 1: 
Descriptions of Corporate
Welfare Programs 
This appendix provides descriptions of the
programs this report categorizes as corporate
welfare. Unless otherwise indicated, the infor-
mation used in the descriptions comes from
the Budget of the United States Government or
from the official publications of the agencies,
bureaus, and programs. 
Department of Agriculture
Agricultural Marketing Service. The Agricultural
Marketing Service collects data on agricultural
11
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commodity markets and, through its Market
News reports, makes that information available
to agricultural producers, processors, distribu-
tors, and others to assist them in the marketing
and distribution of farm products. AMS also
funds the promotion of agricultural products
such as cotton, various fruits and vegetables,
eggs, and beef, among many others. 
Applied Agricultural Research and Development.
The Department of Agriculture, like most feder-
al agencies, funds basic research, applied
research, and developmental research. The main
research arms of the USDA—the Agricultural
Research Service (ARS) and the Cooperative
State Research, Education, and Extension
Service (CSREES)—fund all three sorts of
research. The ARS conducts research focused on
increasing the productivity and quality of agri-
cultural land and products, which serves to
enhance the profitability of farms. The ARS
funds a “technology transfer” program that
seeks, according to the program’s own website,
to “stimulate new business and economic devel-
opment.” The CSREES is designed to assist
farmers in making use of new technologies and
providing one-on-one counseling to help pro-
ducers develop and implement changes to their
business. It also funds agricultural research proj-
ects at the nation’s land-grant universities and
other state institutions. Only the applied and
developmental research elements of each of
those programs—in other words, the portions
that are most closely tied to the creation of new
products and technologies—are included in
Table 1.33
Farm Security and Rural Investment Programs.
These programs, which include the Environ-
mental Quality Incentives Program, pay farm-
ers to use environmentally friendly production
techniques. In many cases, that results in
underwriting general operating expenses of
businesses, such as hog farms, that previously
paid the cost of waste cleanup on their own. In
addition, the Agricultural Management Assis-
tance program, also authorized by the Farm
Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002,
serves as a source of financial risk mitigation
for farms that don’t take part in the federally
subsidized federal crop insurance program.  
Farm Service Agency: Agricultural Credit Insurance
Fund. The Agricultural Credit Insurance Fund
provides direct loans and loan guarantees for
farmers seeking credit to improve or purchase a
farm or to offset the cost of operating a farm. 
Farm Service Agency: Conservation Reserve
Program. The Conservation Reserve Program,
in a sense, pays farmers not to farm. The fed-
eral government essentially rents land from
the farmers in exchange for an agreement by
the farmer to plant a protective cover crop on
those parcels of land that have been enrolled
in the CRP. The stated rationale for this pro-
gram is to help farmers control soil erosion
and to reduce production of surplus com-
modities. However, if a farmer’s own planting
decisions cause soil erosion, the resale value of
the land will likely be reduced. Thus, the CRP
program subsidizes farmers for costs they
should bear on their own or—considering the
program is voluntary—might have borne on
their own in the absence of the program.
Farm Service Agency: Crop and Farm Support
(Commodity Credit Corporation Fund). See Case
Study no. 1. In addition to handing out crop
price support payments and the numerous
programs listed separately in this report, the
CCC also maintains various programs that
subsidize farmers, such as helping finance
transportation and storage of farm products.
All of the activities of the CCC prop up the
farm industry by inflating prices, sustaining
the income of farmers, or subsidizing the
costs of running a farm.
Farm Service Agency: Export Loans Program.
The Export Loans Program promotes the
export of U.S. agricultural commodities by
providing guaranteed and subsidized loans
to the purchasers of those exports, thereby
subsidizing the demand for American farm
products.
Farm Service Agency: Market Access Program.
The Department of Agriculture’s Market
Access Program provides the trade associa-
tions of private agricultural firms with taxpay-
er dollars to help offset their foreign advertis-
ing costs. At least 20 percent of this spending
goes to promote brand-name products over-
seas.34
12
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Farm Service Agency: Tobacco Trust Fund Quota
Buyout. The federal government used to limit,
via federally set quota, the amount of tobacco
each farmer could produce—which in practice
meant limiting the number of tobacco farmers
in America to only those who were given a fed-
erally issued license, called an allotment, to
grow tobacco. In 2004 Congress terminated
this arrangement but at the same time
approved a $9.6 billion buyout of allotment
rights over 10 years.35 Because an end to the
quota system would decrease the value of
tobacco farmland—which was inflated in the
first place by a federal quota system that
restricted the supply of tobacco—defenders of
the buyout suggest it was a necessary form of
compensation for those landowners who held
allotments and should not be considered a
“corporate welfare” program. A better case can
be made, however, that the original quota sys-
tem was an unwarranted windfall subsidy to
tobacco growers and, thus, tobacco growers are
not now entitled to compensation in the same
way that someone from whom government
had taken land through eminent domain is
entitled to compensation. Therefore, the tobac-
co buyout is included on this list as a corporate
subsidy since the plan passed by Congress sim-
ply shifts the cost of supporting tobacco farm-
ers from consumers, who paid higher prices for
tobacco as a result of the quota system, to tax-
payers, who are now footing the bill for what is
best viewed as the same sort of income-support
transfer that many other crops also receive. 
Foreign Agricultural Service: Subsidies for
Foreign Purchase of Commodities (Public Law
480). P.L. 480 promotes the export of U.S.
agricultural commodities by providing subsi-
dized loans to purchasers of those goods in
developing countries. The program also sub-
sidizes U.S. freight carriers that carry those
commodities overseas. 
Foreign Agricultural Service: Market Access and
Development Programs. The main function of
these programs is to provide matching funds to
U.S. firms and trade associations to pay for
activities such as overseas market research and
promotion of products. Other programs, such
as the Export Enhancement Program, subsidize
the export of certain agricultural commodities,
mainly wheat and other grains, through direct
payments to U.S. exporters who compete with
foreign companies in overseas markets. 
Foreign Agricultural Service: Trade Adjustment
Assistance. This program provides technical
assistance and cash payments to farmers and
fisherman who have experienced a decline in
the price of their goods of at least 20 percent
as a result of import competition.
Federal Crop Insurance Premium Subsidies.
The Federal Crop Insurance program direct-
ly subsidizes the crop insurance premiums
that are charged to farmers who hold such
policies.36
Rural Business-Cooperative Service: Biomass
Commercialization Subsidies. This program sub-
sidizes private research on bio-based energy
products and assists businesses hoping to
bring those products to market. It also sup-
ports feedstock development and production.
Rural Business-Cooperative Service: Rural Em-
powerment Zones and Commercial Grants/Cooper-
ative Development Grants/Loan Subsidies. All of
these programs use taxpayer money to help
fund the creation and expansion of businesses
in rural areas, mainly through direct grants and
business loan subsidies. 
Rural Community Advancement Program: Loan
Subsidies/Rural Business Grants. The Rural Com-
munity Advancement Program subsidizes busi-
nesses primarily through loan subsidies. It also
funds grants to businesses and local govern-
ments for explicit “economic development”
purposes, including paying for technical and
training assistance for companies based in rural
areas. 
Rural Utilities Service: Electrification and Tele-
communications Subsidies. The Rural Utilities
Service was established in 1994 to administer
programs of the former Rural Electrification
Administration and the Rural Development
Administration. RUS provides subsidized
loans to electric and telephone utility pro-
viders in rural areas. 
Department of Commerce
Economic Development Administration. The
Economic Development Administration seeks
13
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to improve distressed economies by providing
grants and loans to state and local govern-
ments, nonprofit organizations, and private
businesses in areas with high and persistent
unemployment. EDA’s activities include tech-
nical assistance grants, which provide technol-
ogy transfer assistance to private firms, and
development grants, which fund the construc-
tion and improvement of infrastructure for
the development and expansion of private
industrial parks and ports. EDA also funds the
Trade Adjustment Assistance program, which
gives grants to private firms and industries
that are deemed to have been adversely affect-
ed by increased imports. 
International Trade Administration. The
International Trade Administration’s role is
to “develop the export potential of U.S.
firms” by conducting export promotion pro-
grams, working with firms to develop market
strategies for overseas markets, and protect-
ing uncompetitive industries by enforcing
“antidumping” regulations. 
Minority Business Development Agency. This
agency promotes the development of minor-
ity-owned businesses through the provision
of management assistance and technical
assistance for companies trying to gain
access to capital. The MBDA’s activities often
focus on helping minority-owned businesses
chase government grants and contracts. 
National Institute of Standards and Technology:
Advanced Technology Program. See Case Study
no. 2. 
National Institute of Standards and Technology:
Manufacturing Extension Partnership. This pro-
gram provides grants to fund the creation and
maintenance of dozens of “extension centers”
to assist small and medium-sized manufactur-
ing firms in making use of modern manufac-
turing and production technologies. 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion: National Marine Fisheries Service/Fishery
Promotion and Development Subsidies. The Ameri-
can Fisheries Promotion Act allows the federal
government to give grants directly to fisheries
to increase their productivity. This activity is
financed through the non-weather-related por-
tion of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration budget and includes fishery
and export promotion, as well as the industry
assistance programs of the National Marine
Fisheries Service. 
Department of Defense
Applied Research and Development Funding. The
Pentagon budget includes funding for compa-
nies and industry consortiums to undertake
cost-shared research projects to develop tech-
nologies that have a “dual-purpose” application
(i.e., that can be used by the U.S. military and
sold commercially). These items include endeav-
ors funded by the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency and a portion of the multia-
gency Small Business Innovative Research pro-
gram. One of the stated goals of many of these
programs is the “commercialization” of the
technology developed with taxpayer money. 
Department of Energy
Energy Supply Subsidies. The energy supply
programs aim to develop and deploy new ener-
gy technologies as well as improve on existing
technologies. These activities include applied
R&D and demonstration ventures in partner-
ship with private-sector firms. Research areas
include solar and renewable energy, nuclear
energy, and fusion energy.
Fossil Energy Research and Development. The
fossil energy R&D program is designed to
expand the technology base for private indus-
try engaged in developing new products and
processes. The program supports applied R&D
and cooperative R&D ventures with private-
sector firms. It also supports company-specific
technology development and “demonstration”
activities. Research areas include clean fuels;
clean, efficient power systems; oil technology;
natural gas; and fuel cells.
Coal Research Initiative. This program
includes the FutureGen program that subsi-
dizes private-sector research on a marketable
fossil-fuel-powered electricity and hydrogen
power plant. It also includes the Clean Coal
Power Initiative that funds joint public-private
demonstration projects designed to assist pri-
vate industry in developing coal that burns in
a more environmentally friendly way. 
14
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Hydrogen Fuel Initiative. The Hydrogen
Fuel Initiative directly funds private-sector
research by the major U.S. automakers to
develop hydrogen production, storage, and
fuel cell technologies. The stated goal is to
create commercially viable vehicles that run
on hydrogen by 2020.
FreedomCAR/21st Century Truck Partnership.
This program subsidizes research by major
automakers for developing their own versions
of hybrid, plug-in hybrid, and fuel cell vehicles.
The subsidies also fund private R&D of light-
weight materials, electronic power control,
and electric drive motors.
Department of Housing and Urban
Development
Federal Housing Administration: Mortgage In-
surance Subsidies. The Federal Housing Admini-
stration subsidizes the mortgage banking
industry by providing low-rate mortgage insur-
ance to low- and moderate-income homebuy-
ers. This ensures that banks will recoup the cost
of bad loans they issue at taxpayer expense. Not
surprisingly, one of the FHA’s staunchest
defenders is the Mortgage Bankers Association.
These indirect subsidies to the mortgage bank-
ing industry are particularly unwarranted given
that there is a healthy and expanding private
mortgage insurance industry that can and
would carry the load in the FHA’s absence.
Economic Development Initiative Grants. This
program provides funds to local governments
to undertake a variety of economic develop-
ment activities—such as assistance to private
construction projects—many of which are
financed by federal Section 108 loans. A recent
example of where EDI money often goes can
be found on the HUD website, which touts
the $660,000 that helped fund the construc-
tion of a supermarket in Fort Worth, Texas.37
Community Development Block Grants. This
multi-billion-dollar program funds, among
other things, grants that go directly to bene-
fit business mainly through funding for state
and local economic development projects.
Only the portion of the CDBG program that
was earmarked exclusively for economic
development is included in Table 1. 
Community Development Loans and Credit
Subsidies (Section 108). This program provides
loan guarantees and subsidies to economic
development projects funded by the Com-
munity Development Block Grant program.
Department of State
Foreign Military Financing Program. Estimated
to be the largest single subsidy program for the
U.S. military weapons industry, the Foreign
Military Financing Program supports grants to
more than two dozen countries for the explicit
purpose of purchasing military equipment
manufactured by U.S. firms.38
Department of Transportation 
Federal Aviation Administration: Commercial
Space Transportation. This program was creat-
ed to encourage private space launches and
development of launch vehicles with taxpay-
er money. As the success of the Ansari X-Prize
makes evident, however, venture capital mar-
kets are quite capable of handling this type of
development funding. 
Federal Aviation Administration: Essential Air
Service/Payments to Air Carriers. These pro-
grams subsidize air service for small and
rural communities by providing direct subsi-
dies to U.S. airlines—primarily commuter
carriers—that serve those areas. These pro-
grams are funded occasionally by FAA gener-
al revenue, but most of the revenue comes
from overflight fees paid by foreign airlines.
Although U.S. taxpayers don’t typically bear
the cost of this program, it still transfers
money to U.S. air carriers at the expense of
other corporations. 
Federal Aviation Administration: Grants-in-Aid
for Airports. The Grants-in-Aid for Airports
program provides direct grants to the
nation’s airports to fund airport planning
and development activities. Those activities
include capacity expansion and terminal
improvements, both of which directly benefit
airline companies.  
Federal Railroad Administration: Amtrak Sub-
sidies. The National Railroad Passenger Corpor-
ation, known as Amtrak, was created in 1970. At
its inception, the goal was to use taxpayer funds
15
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to finance long-distance train service in exchange
for allowing private companies to discontinue
those money-losing routes. Amtrak was meant
to exist for only a brief period of time—just long
enough for those routes to achieve profitability
and Amtrak to become self-supporting. Yet
Amtrak continues to lose money, and Congress
continues to bail it out. While still a quasi-gov-
ernmental agency, it is “operated and managed
as a for-profit corporation.”39 Any company that
pays Amtrak to haul freight also receives the ben-
efit of subsidized rates through Amtrak’s
“Express” program. 
Federal Railroad Administration: Next-Generation
High Speed Rail. This program gives money to pri-
vate companies to develop upgraded steel-wheel-
on-rail and magnetically levitated rail vehicles. 
Federal Railroad Administration: Railroad Re-
search and Development. This program finances
research on improved rail technology. These
technological advances are often accomplished
through public-private partnerships geared
toward product improvement. This program
assists the DOT’s “technology transfer” to pri-
vate companies for the purpose of advancing
improved manufacturing processes and the
development of new products for the interna-
tional marketplace. 
Maritime Administration: Guaranteed Loan
Program. This program provides guaranteed
loans for purchasers of ships from the U.S.
shipbuilding industry and for modernizing
U.S. shipyards. 
Maritime Administration: Ocean Freight
Differential Subsidies. When the United States
ships food aid overseas, 75 percent of it must
by law be transported on U.S.-flag carriers,
which tend to be, as a result of restrictions on
competition, more expensive than foreign
carriers. This program funds the difference in
price and is one of the main “cargo prefer-
ence programs” in the federal budget. 
Maritime Administration: Maritime Security
Program. The Maritime Security Program
provides direct payments to U.S.-flag ship
operators engaged in international trade on
condition that a certain percentage of their
fleet remain in service and that the Defense
Department can call on them in wartime to
provide sealift support. These direct subsi-
dies have the effect of propping up U.S.-flag
ship operators by offsetting a portion of their
operating costs. 
Independent Agencies and Others
Agency for International Development Eco-
nomic Development Programs. Some activities of
the Agency for International Development
provide cash assistance to developing coun-
tries for the explicit purpose of economic
development. Yet these programs also have the
effect of subsidizing U.S. firms, particularly in
cases in which the overseas transactions would
not have occurred without the subsidy. In fact,
AID sometimes boasts that the principal ben-
eficiaries of its assistance programs are U.S.
firms that receive the vast majority of the
grants and contracts issued by AID and the
foreign governments it assists.
Appalachian Regional Commission. The Appa-
lachian Regional Commission was established
in the 1960s to help reduce poverty in the 13
states of the mostly rural Appalachian region
by promoting private investment and “eco-
nomic development” efforts, most of which
amount to subsidizing business endeavors.
Much of ARC’s budget goes to subsidize vari-
ous private construction projects, ranging
from ski resorts to football stadiums.  
Bureau of Reclamation. The Bureau of
Reclamation funds the construction, opera-
tion, and maintenance of various water proj-
ects that provide power, irrigation, and flood
control in the western United States. Since its
establishment in 1902, the bureau’s primary
stated goal has been to provide a subsidized
water supply for the agricultural industry in
the western United States.  
Corporation for Public Broadcasting. The CPB
gives grants to state and local public televi-
sion and radio stations that, though they are
nonprofits, function as autonomous corpo-
rations. The programs that appear on those
stations (such as Sesame Street) generate mil-
lions of dollars in merchandise sales revenue
each year for production firms and toy com-
panies that benefit from the federally sup-
ported broadcast of these shows. The broad-
16
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cast stations that receive this money are usu-
ally able to fund much of their operation by
subscriptions and donations. 
Export-Import Bank. See Case Study no. 3. 
International Trade Commission. This agency
assists in the administration of antidumping
tariffs and trade barriers. The budgetary cost
of enforcing these sorts of corporate protec-
tions should be considered an indirect tax-
payer subsidy to business.
National Institutes of Health: Applied Biomedical
Research and Clinical Development. Basic medical
research is only part of what the National
Institutes of Health funds. Some of the NIH
budget supports applied biomedical research as
well as preclinical and clinical development of
specific pharmaceuticals—activities that pro-
vide a valuable benefit to the pharmaceutical
industry. 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
Aeronautical Technology and Commercialization
Activities. This account funds R&D activities
(often in direct partnership with specific com-
panies) that benefit the commercial airline
industry. 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation. The
Overseas Private Investment Corporation pro-
vides direct loans, guaranteed loans, and politi-
cal risk insurance to U.S. companies that invest
in developing countries. OPIC’s activities often
support the foreign operations of Fortune 500
corporations, such as General Electric and
Citibank. In fact, Citibank is consistently the
top beneficiary of OPIC programs.40
Small Business Administration. The Small
Business Administration provides direct
loans and loan guarantees to small business-
es, as well as administrative counseling and
disaster relief. SBA’s subsidized financing is
often targeted at small businesses owned by
minorities or located in economically dis-
tressed areas
Trade and Development Agency. The Trade
and Development Agency provides grants to
fund feasibility studies and other planning ser-
vices for major economic development proj-
ects in developing countries. Those grants go
largely to governments and private investors in
developing countries who then purchase
goods and services from U.S. businesses. TDA
projects thereby subsidize new business oppor-
tunities for large U.S. corporations, such as
Bechtel and General Electric. 
Appendix 2:
Tax Preferences and Other
Types of Indirect Subsidies
Tax Preferences
Tax preferences are described by the U.S.
Office of Management and Budget as provi-
sions in the revenue code that award specific
types of corporations or individuals “a spe-
cial exclusion, exemption, or deduction from
gross income or which provide a special cred-
it, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of lia-
bility.”41 Many of those provisions benefit
only a small number of companies or tax fil-
ers. Yet not every deduction in the tax code
can be considered a form of corporate wel-
fare. Any company may avail itself of certain
tax preferences, such as the tax deduction for
donations to charities, for instance. 
It’s the tax preferences that go to particular
companies or particular industries that are
especially bad economic policy and should be
considered a form of corporate welfare. The
best example is the tax credit that awarded $40
billion in tax liability offsets to producers of
ethanol and alternative fuels.42 Many of those
tax credits go to only a few companies. One
company, Archer Daniels Midland, the multi-
billion-dollar agribusiness based in Decatur,
Illinois, produces 17 percent of the ethanol
used in the United States and receives a large
tax credit.43
Targeted tax preferences do complicate
the tax code and create market distortions.
As a result, they should be terminated in the
context of fundamental tax reform that
strives to lower taxes and make the tax code
simpler and neutral. One way of doing that
would be to replace the current tax system
with a consumption-based tax, such as the
flat tax or a national retail sales tax, that
doesn’t make distinctions between politically
favored taxpayers and others.
17
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For the purposes of this report, tax prefer-
ences have not been included in the list of
corporate welfare programs in Table 1
because they do not require an actual net
expenditure of money by the government. 
Trade Barriers
Another type of preference that the feder-
al government provides to certain businesses
and industries is the imposition of tariffs and
barriers to trade with foreign countries.
There are currently tariffs levied on thou-
sands of goods, ranging from fruit juice and
leather products to pressed glass and cos-
tume jewelry.44 Other barriers to trade
include import quotas on certain farm com-
modities. All such barriers have the effect of
protecting domestic industries from foreign
competition. They also have the effect of
restricting the free flow of goods in the econ-
omy, leading to decreased supply, forgone
economic production, and higher prices for
consumers. The cost to consumers of the
most significant trade barriers was recently
estimated at $3.7 billion a year.45
The costs of these trade barriers are not
included in Table 1 because they rarely trans-
late into a cost associated with a line item in
the federal budget. Note, however, that the
federal agencies that administer trade barriers,
such as the International Trade Commission,
do result in a direct budgetary cost and are
included in Table 1. 
Government-Sponsored Enterprises
During the 20th century the federal govern-
ment chartered corporations for certain public
policy purposes. The main government-spon-
sored enterprises (GSEs) are the Federal
National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae),
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corpor-
ation (Freddie Mac), the Federal Home Loan
Banks (sometimes called Flubbies), and the
Farm Credit System (which consists of the
Agricultural Credit Bank, the Federal Agricul-
tural Mortgage Corporation, and the Farm
Credit Banks). Those institutions were sup-
posed to create markets for cut-rate loans to
poor families and farmers, which, it was
argued, would not exist in the absence of gov-
ernment action. 
The GSE loan portfolios represent a very
large share of the lending market in their
respective fields. In fact, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, two of the biggest GSEs, account
for a combined 48 percent of the overall con-
ventional mortgage market and 39 percent of
the total residential mortgage market.46
Technically, GSEs are publicly traded cor-
porations—they have shareholders and boards
of directors. However, those companies receive
many benefits that actually make them more
like government-protected bureaucracies.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, for instance, are
exempt from most of the regulations that
bind truly private mortgage lenders. In addi-
tion, they have a contingency line of credit in
the amount of $2.25 billion that can be drawn
from the federal Treasury. There is also an
implicit understanding that the federal gov-
ernment will bail out the GSEs if they ever col-
lapse under the weight of their rapidly expand-
ing debt. That has created unfair competition
with private lenders. A recent Federal Reserve
Bank study estimated that these implicit sub-
sidies equal between $122 billion and $182 bil-
lion.47
There is no item in the budget that corre-
sponds to that estimated cost, so it is not
included in this report’s total subsidy cost
estimate. However, it is obvious that the
implicit federal subsidies to those companies
distort the lending market and represent an
advantage that other lenders do not receive. 
Notes
1  Bureau of Economic Analysis data available at
www.bea.gov.
2.  The estimates in this report are based on the def-
initions of “basic” and “applied” research expendi-
tures devised by the Association for the
Advancement of Science. Their numerous publica-
tions on R&D can be found at http://www.
aaas.org/spp/rd/. The Congressional Budget Office
makes a distinction similar to the one made in this
paper in “Federal Financial Support of Business,”
July 1995, http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index
=15&sequence=0.
18
339840 Pa592_1stclass.qxp  5/8/2007  11:31 AM  Page 18
3.  See F. A. Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in
Society,” in The Libertarian Reader, ed. Davis Boaz
(New York: Free Press, 1997), pp. 215–24.
4.  Veronique De Rugy, “The SBA’s Justification
IOU,” Regulation, Spring 2007, pp. 26–34.
5.  A brief treatment of this theory is found in
Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), chap. 2.
6.  For a discussion of the constitutional limita-
tions on federal spending, see Roger Pilon, “On
the Folly and Illegitimacy of Industrial Policy,”
Stanford Law and Policy Review 5, no. 1 (Fall 1993):
103–18.
7.  Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the
United States Government: Fiscal Year 2008: Historical
Tables (Washington: Government Printing Office,
2007), Table 3.2, p. 60. The estimate is for Function
351, “Farm income stabilization.”
8.  U.S. Department of Agriculture, Farm Service
Agency, “Fact Sheet: Production Flexibility Con-
tracts, Marketing Loss Payments and Marketing
Assistance Loans,” February 1999, http://www.fsa.
usda.gov/pas/publications/facts/html/Prodflex’9
9.htm.
9.  Author’s calculations based on data in ibid.
10. Jean Yavis Jones, ed., “A New Farm Bill:
Comparing the 2002 Law with Previous Law and
House and Senate Bills,” Congressional Research
Service, January 21, 2003, p. CRS-10.
11. Author’s calculations based on data from
Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the
United States Government: Fiscal Year 2008: Historical
Tables, Table 3.2, pp. 59–60.
12. Data from the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Economic Research Service, available
at http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FarmandRelat
edEmployment/. This statistic is for 2002, the
most recent available. 
13. Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report
of the President (Washington: Government Printing
Office, February 2002), Table B-100, p. 435. This
data series detailing the percentage of Americans
living on farms was discontinued in 1992.
However, there is no reason to believe that the per-
centage of citizens living on farms has increased.
14. For a discussion of these issues, see David
Orden, Robert Paarlberg, and Terry Roe, Policy
Reform in American Agriculture: Analysis and Prognosis
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); and
Yair Mundlak, Agriculture and Economic Growth:
Theory and Measurement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2000).
15. Carol A. Jones, Hisham El-Osta, and Robert
Green, Economic Well-Being of Farm Households, U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Economic Research
Service Economic Brief no. 7, March 2006, p. 2,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/EB7/EB7.
pdf.
16. Orden, Paarlberg, and Roe, p. 33.
17. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic
Research Service, “Farm Income and Costs: Farm
Household Well-Being” October 10, 2004, http://
www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/FarmIncome/fbsas-
set_txt.htm. This analysis is based on annual Agri-
cultural Resource Management Survey conducted
by the Economic Research Service.
18. Estimate based on data from the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture and complied by the En-
vironmental Working Group in its Farm Subsidy
Database, http://www.ewg.org/farm/.
19. See Daniel T. Griswold, Stephen Slivinski, and
Christopher Preble, “Ripe for Reform: Six Good
Reasons to Reduce U.S. Farm Subsidies and Trade
Barriers,” Cato Institute Trade Policy Analysis no.
30, September 14, 2005.
20. Robin M. Nazzaro, director of natural resources
and environment, Government Accountability
Office, “Advanced Technology Program: Inherent
Factors in Selection Process Are Likely to Limit
Identification of Similar Research,” Testimony
before the Subcommittee on Federal Financial
Management, Government Information, and
International Security of the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Government Affairs,
GAO-05-759T, May 2005, p. 1.
21. General Accounting Office, “Measuring
Performance: The Advanced Technology Program
and Private-Sector Funding,” GAO/RECD-96-47,
January 1996, p. 3.
22. Nazzaro, pp. 4, 7–9.
23. Many companies receive more than is listed in
the table since they are also members of multiple
consortiums and joint ventures that receive feder-
al money to divvy up among participants. The
numbers used in this study are a representative
sample of the total money received.
24. Quoted in Scott J. Wallsten, “The R&D Boon-
doggle,” Regulation 23, no. 4 (2000): 13.
25. This result is arrived at by regression analysis
outlined in ibid., pp. 14–15.
26. Export-Import Bank of the United States,
19
339840 Pa592_1stclass.qxp  5/8/2007  11:31 AM  Page 19
2006 Annual Report (Washington: Export-Import
Bank, 2007), p. 1, http://www.exim.gov/about/re
ports/ar/ar2006/index.html.
27. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of
the United States Government: Fiscal Year 2008,
Appendix, p. 1064.
28. Tim Carney, The Big Ripoff: How Big Business and
Big Government Steal Your Money (New York: Wiley,
2006), pp. 75–90.
29. Export-Import Bank, Report to the U.S. Congress on
Export Credit Competition and the Export-Import Bank of
the United States (Washington: Export-Import Bank,
2006), Appendix B, http://www.exim.gov/about/re
ports/compet/documents/2005Competitiveness
Report.pdf.
30. Ibid., chap. 4, figure 11
31. Kenneth R. Mayer, “The Limits of Delegation:
The Rise and Fall of BRAC,” Regulation 22, no. 3
(1999): 34.
32. Ibid., p. 32.
33. Supporters of agricultural research programs
suggest that the applied and developmental
aspects of research are too costly and risky for
farmers to undertake on their own, leading to an
underinvestment in the sort of research that could
increase agricultural productivity. An important
part of this perceived market failure is the inability
of farmers to—even if they had the wherewithal to
fund this research—capture the economic gains
from a new technology that could be copied by
competitors. For decades, the Economic Research
Service of the USDA—long a proponent of the mar-
ket failure argument—has noted that public fund-
ing has outpaced private funding for agricultural
research since the 1940s. However, those trends
have shifted recently. As the ERS noted in 2006,
“The public sector was the primary investor in agri-
cultural research prior to the 1980s, but now the
private sector funds the development of many new
agricultural technologies.” Today, private-sector
spending on agricultural research is over 30 per-
cent higher than public support for such research.
The ERS surmises that expansions in intellectual
property protections that were granted to farm
researchers by federal statute in the 1970s and early
1980s have contributed to mitigating the market
failure and driven the increase in private-sector
agricultural research. If those trends continue, it
will become increasingly difficult for supporters of
agricultural research to justify taxpayer funding of
applied and developmental research in this way.
For a discussion of these trends, see Keith Wiebe
and Noel Gollehon, eds., “Agricultural Resources
and Environmental Indicators, 2006,” Economic
Information Bulletin (Economic Research Service)
no. 16 (July 2006): 59–65, http://www.ers.usda.gov/
publications/arei/eib16/eib16_3-2.pdf.
34. Congressional Budget Office, Budget Options
(Washington: CBO, February 2007), p. 350.
35. For a description of how the tobacco buyout
program works, see A. Blake Brown, “A Summary
of the Tobacco Buyout,” North Carolina State
University, Department of Agricultural and Re-
source Economics, November 14, 2004, http://
ipm.ncsu.edu/Production_Guides/Flue-Cured/
2005/chptr1.pdf.
36. For a further explanation of FCIC programs and
the problems they create, see Jerry R. Skees “The Bad
Harvest,” Regulation (Spring 2001): 16–21; and
Robert W. Klein and Gregory Krohm, “A New
Season?” Regulation (Winter 2006–2007): 26–33. 
37. “Fort Worth Grocery Store a Welcome Addition,”
January 1, 2007, http://www.hud.gov/local/tx/com
munity/2002-08-23.cfm.
38. For a more detailed study of this program, see
William D. Hartung, “Corporate Welfare for
Weapons Makers: The Hidden Costs of Spending
on Defense and Foreign Aid,” Cato Institute Policy
Analysis no. 350, August 12, 1999.
39. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of
the United States Government: Fiscal Year 2008,
Appendix, p. 821.
40. Overseas Private Investment Corporation, 2005
Annual Report (Washington: OPIC, 2006); and Ian
Vásquez and John Welborn, “Reauthorize or Retire
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation?” Cato
Institute Foreign Policy Briefing no. 78, September
15, 2003.
41. See “Tax Expenditures,” in Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, Budget of the United States Govern-
ment: Fiscal Year 2008: Analytical Perspectives, p. 285.
42. Ibid., Table 5-2, p. 66. 
43. Brent D. Yacobucci, “Fuel Ethanol: Background
and Public Policy Issues,” Congressional Research
Service, March 3, 2006, p. 4.
44. See U.S. International Trade Commission,
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007).
45. U.S. International Trade Commission, The
Economic Effects of Significant U.S. Import Restrictions:
Fifth Update 2007 (Washington: Government Print-
ing Office, February 2007), p. xvii.
46. Lawrence White, “Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and
Housing Finance: Why True Privatization Is Good
20
339840 Pa592_1stclass.qxp  5/8/2007  11:31 AM  Page 20
Public Policy,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis no.
528, October 7, 2004, p. 4.
47. Wayne Passmore, “The GSE Implicit Subsidy
and the Value of Government Ambiguity,” Finance
and Economics Discussion Series, Federal Reserve
Board, May 2005, p. 3, http://www.federalreserve.
gov/Pubs/feds/2005/200505/200505pap.pdf.
21
339840 Pa592_1stclass.qxp  5/8/2007  11:31 AM  Page 21
OTHER STUDIES IN THE POLICY ANALYSIS SERIES
591. The Perfect Firestorm: Bringing Forest Service Wildfire Costs under 
Control by Randal O’Toole (April 30, 2007)
590. In Pursuit of Happiness Research: Is It Reliable? What Does It Imply for 
Policy? by Will Wilkinson (April 11, 2007)
589. Energy Alarmism: The Myths That Make Americans Worry about Oil by 
Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press (April 5, 2007)
588. Escaping the Trap: Why the United States Must Leave Iraq by Ted Galen 
Carpenter (February 14, 2007)
587. Why We Fight: How Public Schools Cause Social Conflict by Neal 
McCluskey (January 23, 2007)
586. Has U.S. Income Inequality Really Increased? by Alan Reynolds (January 8, 
2007)
585. The Cato Education Market Index by Andrew J. Coulson with advisers 
James Gwartney, Neal McCluskey, John Merrifield, David Salisbury, and 
Richard Vedder (December 14, 2006)
584. Effective Counterterrorism and the Limited Role of Predictive Data 
Mining by Jeff Jonas and Jim Harper (December 11, 2006)
583. The Bottom Line on Iran: The Costs and Benefits of Preventive War 
versus Deterrence by Justin Logan (December 4, 2006)
582. Suicide Terrorism and Democracy: What We’ve Learned Since 9/11 by 
Robert A. Pape (November 1, 2006)
581. Fiscal Policy Report Card on America’s Governors: 2006 by Stephen 
Slivinski (October 24, 2006)
580. The Libertarian Vote by David Boaz and David Kirby (October 18, 2006)
579. Giving Kids the Chaff: How to Find and Keep the Teachers We Need
by Marie Gryphon (September 25, 2006)
578. Iran’s Nuclear Program: America’s Policy Options by Ted Galen Carpenter
(September 20, 2006)
339840 Pa592_1stclass.qxp  5/8/2007  11:31 AM  Page 22
577. The American Way of War: Cultural Barriers to Successful 
Counterinsurgency by Jeffrey Record (September 1, 2006)
576. Is the Sky Really Falling? A Review of Recent Global Warming Scare 
Stories by Patrick J. Michaels (August 23, 2006)
575. Toward Property Rights in Spectrum: The Difficult Policy Choices Ahead 
by Dale Hatfield and Phil Weiser (August 17, 2006)
574. Budgeting in Neverland: Irrational Policymaking in the U.S. Congress 
and What Can Be Done about It by James L. Payne (July 26, 2006)
573. Flirting with Disaster: The Inherent Problems with FEMA by Russell S. 
Sobel and Peter T. Leeson (July 19, 2006)
572. Vertical Integration and the Restructuring of the U.S. Electricity Industry
by Robert J. Michaels (July 13, 2006)
571. Reappraising Nuclear Security Strategy by Rensselaer Lee (June 14, 2006)
570. The Federal Marriage Amendment: Unnecessary, Anti-Federalist, and 
Anti-Democratic by Dale Carpenter (June 1, 2006)
569. Health Savings Accounts: Do the Critics Have a Point? by Michael F. 
Cannon (May 30, 2006)
568. A Seismic Shift: How Canada’s Supreme Court Sparked a Patients’ 
Rights Revolution by Jacques Chaoulli (May 8, 2006)
567. Amateur-to-Amateur: The Rise of a New Creative Culture by F. Gregory 
Lastowka and Dan Hunter (April 26, 2006)
566. Two Normal Countries: Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic 
Relationship by Christopher Preble (April 18, 2006)
565. Individual Mandates for Health Insurance: Slippery Slope to National 
Health Care by Michael Tanner (April 5, 2006)
564. Circumventing Competition: The Perverse Consequences of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act by Timothy B. Lee (March 21, 2006)
563. Against the New Paternalism: Internalities and the Economics of Self-
Control by Glen Whitman (February 22, 2006)
562. KidSave: Real Problem, Wrong Solution by Jagadeesh Gokhale and Michael 
Tanner (January 24, 2006)
339840 Pa592_1stclass.qxp  5/8/2007  11:31 AM  Page 23
339840 Pa592_1stclass.qxp  5/8/2007  11:31 AM  Page 24
561. Economic Amnesia: The Case against Oil Price Controls and Windfall 
Profit Taxes by Jerry Taylor and Peter Van Doren (January 12, 2006)
560. Failed States and Flawed Logic: The Case against a Standing Nation-
Building Office by Justin Logan and Christopher Preble (January 11, 2006)
559. A Desire Named Streetcar: How Federal Subsidies Encourage Wasteful 
Local Transit Systems by Randal O’Toole (January 5, 2006)
558. The Birth of the Property Rights Movement by Steven J. Eagle (December 15, 
2005)
557. Trade Liberalization and Poverty Reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa by 
Marian L. Tupy (December 6, 2005)
556. Avoiding Medicare’s Pharmaceutical Trap by Doug Bandow (November 30,
2005)
555. The Case against the Strategic Petroleum Reserve by Jerry Taylor and 
Peter Van Doren (November 21, 2005)
554. The Triumph of India’s Market Reforms: The Record of the 1980s and 
1990s by Arvind Panagariya (November 7, 2005)
553. U.S.-China Relations in the Wake of CNOOC by James A. Dorn 
(November 2, 2005)
552. Don’t Resurrect the Law of the Sea Treaty by Doug Bandow (October 13, 2005)
551. Saving Money and Improving Education: How School Choice Can Help 
States Reduce Education Costs by David Salisbury (October 4, 2005)
550. The Personal Lockbox: A First Step on the Road to Social Security 
Reform by Michael Tanner (September 13, 2005)
549. Aging America’s Achilles’ Heel: Medicaid Long-Term Care by Stephen A. 
Moses (September 1, 2005)
548. Medicaid’s Unseen Costs by Michael F. Cannon (August 18, 2005)
547. Uncompetitive Elections and the American Political System by Patrick 
Basham and Dennis Polhill (June 30, 2005)
546. Controlling Unconstitutional Class Actions: A Blueprint for Future 
Lawsuit Reform by Mark Moller (June 30, 2005)
Untitled-2   2 2/7/06   4:35:00 PM
